Medical Humanism – Chapter Summary 1

[The following is a summary of the book by Hiro Hiral, Medical Humanism and Natural Philosophy (Brill Publishing, December 30th, 2011). Work in progress, and feedbacks are more than welcome.] Chapter 1 discusses about the historiographical survey of the concept of formative power by the humanist physician Leoniceno (1428-1524). Leoniceno’s embryological treatise, On Formative Power (De virtute formativa), includes the analyses of the concept employed by the medical authorities in antiquity onwards, from Aristotle to Averroes, and interprets what was meant by the formative powers. This chapter follows the line of exposition demonstrated in Leoniceno’s book, thereby the focus of this chapter is: reconstruction of Galen’s view on the concept, criticism of Pietro d’Abano for identifying the celestial heat with the formative power by examining Aristotle’s own opinion. Then, Leoniceno gives us his own interpretation on the issue, closing with refuting the account offered by Averroes. Galen, d’Abano and Leoniceno’s Commentary on Them Galen accepts that there must be a supreme intelligence in directing the formation of fetuses, but was uncertain whether or not to equate it with the soul. Traditionally, it was equated with the vegetative soul as it nourishes the fetus, but Galen thought of such vegetative soul to be without intelligence or reason, and hence irrational. Although Leoniceno attributes to Galen the view of Hippocrates that the vegetative soul must be possessed, above all, by the fetuses and it must be that which fashions the body. However, the formation of the fetus and the augmentation, or the nourishing, of the body are two different ideas, for the vegetative soul can nourish the body without intelligence but cannot direct the form of the fetus there is a forming principle. Further, Leoniceno points out the apparent disagreement of Galen with himself in suggesting that the formation of the fetus is attributed to both 1) the vegetative soul and 2) the natural heat, but tries to make sense of these two different ideas by equating them with one another. Leoniceno here appeals to Hippocrates again as the paradigmatic authority of the Greek physicians, and explains that Hippocrates taught the body’s natural heat or the constituent is referred to as body’s temperament, or the mixture of the four elemental qualities. Leoniceno justifies his use of the word temperament to mean the body’s natural heat as the vegetative soul by citing Galen’s own work, On Tremor, in which Galen calls the soul the animal’s natural heat. This heat, then, is neither of external origin as some argued of it as the celestial heat, nor does it come after the animal’s birth, but congenial to it. Here, we see the origin of the Galenic theory of the native or inbred heat. According to Galen, Aristotle wondered if the formative power should be attributed to something more divine. Leoniceno locates the source of such doubt in Meteorology 4.12, where Aristotle attributes the formation of the homogeneous parts to the active qualities of hot and cold, while invoking another cause for the organization of heterogeneous parts. The former is the mutative cause, as it forms organs and alters the shapes for fitting ones, while the latter is the formative cause proper, in that it assumes the supreme art and intelligence of the Creator, who directs the organization of the heterogeneous parts in the human whole. Pietro d’Abano also aligns with Galen and argues that the formative power is of the divine origin and hence active and superior to any other generative power. However, it being immaterial, it cannot act directly on matter, so it needs a certain vehicle that carries it. This subtle body of vehicle is the spirit. In addition, such formative power needs the celestial heat, which is always vivifying and never destructive, as well as the elemental heat, which can vivify and preserve the natural things with the help of celestial heat. Leoniceno, however, disagrees with d’Abano and criticizes him for contradicting Arostotle’s teaching. Although Leoniceno recognizes two kinds of heat involved in the generative process (one is used by nature in generation of animals while the other is used in art for perfection of its own works), he argues that the heat residing in the seed of animals is far from divine or celestial origin. Even though Aristotle himself says that this heat in the seed is analogous to celestial heat, Leoniceno insists that it remains an analogy as Aristotle adds that this vital heat is not fire but the foam-like natural principle in the breath, since as we see no generation happening in solids or liquids under the influence of fire, the heat of the sun which generates is neither fire nor derives its origin from fire.[Q1: But when Aristotle speaks of the vital principle in the generation of animals as analogous to the celestial heat, and it itself is neither fire nor derives its origin from fire, is he not saying that it is not the elementary heat and that it is more like or identical to the celestial heat?] From this textual evidence, Leoniceno argues that this vital heat is enclosed in the seed or the spirit (i.e. breath), and concludes that what is analogous is not identical. In addition to the two heat (one by nature, the other by art), Leoniceno admits a third type of fire, which results from the elemental fire but is more suitable for generating living beings. [Q2: So this vital principle Aristotle speaks of is of elemental fire but is different in its nature?] Leoniceno thus refuses to identify the external celestial heat as the formative power internal to the seed of animals. Leoniceno’s Analyses on Alexander of Aphrodisius and Simplicius Alexander of Aphrodisius likened the vital, formative power in living beings as an irrational mechanism, calling it “nature” and compared its movements to those of marionettes. This is a visualization of Aristotle’s view that the father first introduces the seed a force which moves the matter, along with the form of the father. This first movement activates the second stage of fetal formation, the third activates the fourth and so on. Once the first movement is activated, the rest follows rather indifferent to choice or reason. This is how Alexander qualified “nature” as an irrational power while conceiving it as a determined principle inserted into matter. It is an irrational principle only relative to the reason-principle, producing in a cognizant manner. Simplicius, from whose commentary on Alexander we know much about Alexander’s writings, agrees that nature is like marionettes producing the consistency and exactness, but disagrees with the latter that nature is irrational, even in the relative sense of the term. For Simplicius cannot understand why it is that natural things exist in a way that preserves order and consistency without having any cognition to reach a definite end like the movement of marionettes. It seems rather reasonable to say that nature is not irrational but co-responsible with the immediate causes of things that are generated and corrupted. These immediate causes, in turn, are governed by the celestial bodies according to which beings on this earth are modified. Simplicius, in this way, conceived such formative power as auxiliary to the celestial and intellectual causes. Nature (or formative power) then is the concause with the celestial cause for Simplicius. Leoniceno agrees with Simplicius in conceiving the formative power as auxiliary to the soul, and distinguishes the nature from the soul itself. Leoniceno quotes Simplicius as a conclusion and argues that the seed’s inner nature is the cause for animal generation.Averroes and Themistius Averroes, in like manner, argues that this generative/formative power differs from the other natural powers in animal bodies and that compares such power as belonging to intellectual cause. Since this power acts with the help of the seed’s inner heat, it is obvious that it lies in the seed as a form. For Averroes, this form is distinct from the animal’s innate heat but is comparable to the soul in celestial bodies. Here, we see a divergence from Leoniceno’s, and Simplicius’s, argument that the formative power is not the same as the celestial heat, and Averroes goes back to the identification of the innate heat with the external celestial heat. Leoniceno criticizes him for erroneously drawing upon the conclusion from Themistius and Avicenna’s theory of Giver of Forms, and explains that Themistius’s theory does not demand the existence of a higher agent separated from the body in animal generation, as it would in the case of the Giver of Forms. According to Themistius, Leoniceno wants to argue, the soul residing in the seed is sufficient to form matter. In sum, Leoniceno agrees with Simplicius and refuses to identify the formative power with the external celestial heat, while Pietro d’Abano and Averroes belong to the other camp due to the misunderstanding of the interpretations of Aristotle offered by Themistius and Avicenna. Galen is situated somewhat in the middle ground in that he equates the formative power as not something from external heat nor does it come after the birth, but is congenial to the birth of the animals. Although Galen himself is uncertain of the origin of this formative power, it accords with Leoniceno’s view that it is the animal’s native heat. Galen, however, also argues that this formative power is of a divine origin. To that extent, Leoniceno and Simplicius differ from Galen’s view on what this generative heat really is. Formative Power is… For Galen => of divine origin and shows a sign of intellect; is congenial to the animal’s birth For Pietro & Averroes (via Themistius & Avicenna) => is of divine origin and distinct from the inbred heat. For Leoniceno & Simplicius => is NOT of divine origin and auxiliary to the soul or external heat, but instead is the animal’s power or aptitude in virtue of which lifeless things can be moved an changed. “All have in semen that which causes it to be productive; I mean what is called vital heat. This is not fire nor any such force, but it is the breath included in the semen and the foam-like, and the natural principle in the breath, being analogous to the element of the stars. Hence whereas fire generates no animal and we do not find any living thing forming in either solids or liquids under the influence of fire, the heat of the sun and that of animals does generate them. Not only is this true of the heat that works through the semen, but whatever other residue of the animal nature there may be, this also has still a vital principle in it. From such considerations it is clear that the heat in animals neither is fire nor derives its origin from fire.” See Aristotle, Generation of Animals, Bk. II, 3. 736b32-737a7. Simplicius quoted in Leoniceno. “But since bodies are far removed from indivisible and incorporeal nature as well as from the life that subsists in absolute being, and since they are lifeless and do not breathe at all in themselves, too chilled for any kind of life, they have within themselves the last sort of life, which relates that which we call “nature” to power and aptitude. Because of it, even lifeless things can be moved and changed, and it is even said that they are born and act passively on each other.” See, page 38 of this book.