EMPATHY: THE SOURCE OF GOOD AND EVIL

I:  Sentimental Value

Why do we have no problems killing mosquitoes or small insects when we do have difficulty in justifying killing animals such as cats and dogs, and the like? Is it the size that matters? Some people say it is the size of the brain, or the mental capacity, while others say it is physiological similarities to us, human beings. It seems to work, as we have absolutely no problems in treating stones and rocks badly as we would have in treating living creatures. But it is objected that if all that matters is the mental capacities and such, it would follow that human babies can be rightfully used as experimental objects just we treat many of the non-human creatures in like manner. But we seem to have more problems in treating babies that way. I have listed some of the elements of the arguments of such kind below.

Inanimate Objects (rocks, pencils, desks, – trees and plants may be added – and airplanes, etc…

ð    No Feeling

ð    No Intelligence

Animate Creatures (mosquitoes, small insects, – trees and plants may be added – etc…)

ð    Little Feeling

ð    Little Intelligence

Animals (cats, dogs, monkeys, and fish, and the like)

ð    Feeling

ð    Little Intelligence

Babies (human babies)

ð    Feeling

ð    Little Intelligence

Indeed, this chart explains why rocks do not deserve moral consideration in the same way small insects like mosquitoes do (if they do require any). It could be argued that rocks and insects, like the ‘lettuce’ raised in the class, do deserve moral consideration. However, even the proponents of this view must agree that the amount of moral consideration required for them is proportionate to their ability to experience pain and similar harm whatever it is that is done to them, as the victims of a ‘moral crime’ must be capable of recognizing the assault and its implication that is done to them (whether or not the victim is aware of the assault committed at the time of the assault taking place does not matter, for the victim is nevertheless capable of being aware of the pain and humiliation – go through suffer – once he or she has become aware of the assault). So it seems that any choice made in the name of morality, there must be at least one being who can be aware of the weight of the assault involved. From this, it follows that there is no morality or ethical action/choices going on between a rock and a stone or between the gravity and the electricity, and so on.

It is not to say that one cannot perform a moral action between I and a rock, since as long as I am involved in the action, as I am capable of being aware of the kind of feeling an action would produce if done to myself or even to the rock, an action can be moral or immoral depending on how I value this relationship between me and the rock. Though, the only judge who can say an action is moral or not is myself.

So in the case of Inanimate Objects, as long as an action is inflicted upon and every involving party is unable to be aware of or feel any pain at all, an action can never be either moral or immoral.

What about the second group? Animate Creatures? Because animals are sensitive to pleasure and pain – as their physiology requires them to be – there we have an action that is either moral or immoral for the first time, as an action is considered to be immoral if it inflicts pain on oneself or others against his/their will. This is taken granted since we must all agree that living creatures are all generally inclined towards avoiding what is painful. I say ‘generally’ because there may be some instances where one might prefer pain, however, those instances are strictly particular, and no living creature existing on this planet seeks for what is painful for the sake of painfulness, that is, one might inflict pain on oneself if it had to be done in order to achieve a greater end, but that is the same as saying one is striving towards what is pleasurable, and not what is painful.

A complete moral action, therefore, is an action that does not produce any pain from any angle. E.g., even lifting a cup on the desk may be a moral action as long as it does not produce any harm whatsoever. That is, assuming that there are no small insects or any kind, and that assuming all we are dealing with is strictly with Inanimate Objects, the only morality we have is dependent upon the agent who performs the action, as was said earlier. This would, however, complicate the issue more if there are two or more agents who do not belong to the category of Inanimate Objects involved in this action.

Thus, any action performed between Animate Creatures must deserve a moral consideration, again, in due to the proportion to their ability to be aware of the assault done to them and feel the pain inflicted upon them.

But then, why do Animals seem to deserve more moral attentions than do Inanimate Creatures? Better question, why do babies deserve more moral consideration than Animals do, if all that matters is whether the victim is able to be aware of the assault done to him and/or the ability to feel pain? Babies can feel as much pain as animals can, as they both possess the ability to feel pain and to be aware of the assault.

That the amount of moral consideration given to Animate Creatures is lower than that of given to Animals or Human Babies is apparent for some reasons, one of which we have already discussed above. That is, Animate Creatures possess less ability to feel pain than those of Animals or Babies, and therefore, if we are to give the same amount of moral consideration to all the groups, it would mean that we all remain impartial to any living creatures equally which must of necessity require cessation of emotion. But if we take away emotion, we lose what we are on the fundamental ground, that is we lose feelings, and become insensitive. Not to mention it would defeat the purpose of the concept of morality. As was confirmed earlier, among Inanimate Objects they do not require moral attention. As feelings is present in all living creatures, or at least we assume that every living organism has feelings no matter how insignificant – and that is the reason why we argue whether to treat animals, babies, and insects all equally or not – , and taking the feelings away from a living creature leaves the living creature a material being and reduces it to the level of Inanimate Creatures.

Therefore, it seems, we feel pleasure or pain depending on how much fairness is weighed into the consideration of morality when taking an action, and that fairness arises from the proportionate judgment in making a choice of any kind that involves quantity.

That is why the amount of moral consideration given to Animate Creatures is lower than the amount given to Animals or Babies, and higher than the amount given to Inanimate Objects.

Then, going back to the earlier problem, why do Babies and Animals not deserve the same amount of moral consideration, but we tend to put more weight in the value of human babies than that of animals?

II: Self-Preservation; the Innate Duty

Living creatures are all striving for their own preservation, may it be for the individuals or for their collective species. For no one pursues self-destruction for the virtue of itself, as we do in the case of self-preservation. For, if the purpose of, or the nature of, any living creature is to destroy himself, the nature has failed when it begins its life; further, it is supremely peculiar that we do not have any tendency or inclination towards starvation or being inflicted damage upon ourselves if we are pursuing the self-destruction as species. Even suicide is done to preserve oneself in such a way that it escapes pain from his living life, for no one who enjoys fully and never feels pain about his life would ever deliberately commit suicide (in case of religious crusade, they would do so because they feel it is their duty, but they do not necessarily enjoy in the sense that they would enjoy playing chess or dining out, so again, this conflict between the kind of satisfaction gained by the possible fulfillment of the duty and the wanting of continuing life must necessarily coincide, and there we have a friction of unpleasantness or pain).

So a life without impediment, or a fulfilling life by definition, must be that a life that avoids any pain on the fundamental basis. In fact, suicide is done in so far as it preserves its living essence – the felling – and if it were to deprive him of his essence – the soul – then, he would not have done it. Here, the essence of living creatures in life is called ‘the feeling’ whereas the essence of the dead may be called ‘the soul.’ But these two are merely the manifestations of the essence in different environments.

For above-mentioned reasons, it is sufficient to come to a conclusion that we as living creatures must be prone to self-preservation rather than to self-destruction. It is apparent that we are not pursuing something in between, ‘the self-stabilization,’ or such kind, as we inevitably grow and change shapes and thoughts as we grow up.

Therefore, self-preservation is not just a necessary but a required state we are in as long as we are living. Since self-preservation is an essential feature of any living organism, it would be immoral to perform an action that prevents someone from self-preserving himself. So morality must come in second to the notion of self-preservation.

Now, going back to our original problem, why do we value babies more than animals, even though both parties possess ‘the feelings’ and/or ‘the ability to be aware of an assault?

As was said earlier, a moral action is any action that is performed between two sensitive agents as well as intelligence – as the ability of awareness of what happens is considered an intellectual activity, that is, being aware has nothing to do just with having senses and merely responding to a sense perception without any knowledge of it at all. It requires at least slight understanding of what has happened to oneself, in order for one to be aware of an event. This would lead us to conclude that any being that can be aware of something possesses intellect, either potential or actual.  Potential in the sense that it may not possess awareness at the time of its birth, but it will most likely develop awareness in the near future, or in the sense that the agent could have been aware or could have had a capacity to be aware of, and actual in the sense that it is aware of what is currently happening to it.

However, this clarification does not still clarify the primary problem in considering this case, since this would confirm that if a baby has no potentiality as to develop sensory perceptions or awareness in the future, it might as well be justifiably said that babies do not deserve any more moral attention than animals do. In which case, eating babies as a substitute for a ration when food is scarce may be reasonable. Or using babies as an experimental object as we do to animals. For what distinguishes babies from animals if this is all there is, that sensibility and awareness either potentially or actually.

Here, the point made earlier comes to aid us in understanding clearly what is going on in our mind when making a choice that is worthy of being called a moral action. That is self-preservation of the individuals and/or the collective species one belongs to. In addition to the sensibility and the awareness either potentially or actually, there must be a universally held and accepted dogma that we are naturally inclined to preserve oneself, and it is the one and only duty or a natural course we take as a living creature. A life already presupposes this notion of ‘self-preservation.’ That is why, we value babies more than animals even though they both possess the same level of sensibility and awareness, because our principle of self-preservation tells us to value one of its own kind more than the other, and that it in some sense supersedes the notion of morality; or an equal consideration of morals. Therefore, it is not always right to promote happiness, if I may say, of one creature over another solely basing on the sensibility and ability to be aware of an action. The arcane principle is that we are entitled, and by nature necessitated, to pursue our own self-preservation.

In this sense, animals are acting moral when they hurt human beings to protect oneself or one of its own kind, just as same as we are being moral when we kill a boar just to protect a child from being killed. For one cannot be impartial to his own kind.

III: Mutually Communicative Response

In order for there to be a recognized moral action – or any moral action must be made aware thus recognized by both or either parties involved in the action – there has to be more than a recipient of an action who is capable of feeling and being aware of an action, but also an agent capable of feeling pain and being aware of an action infringed upon or performed on and this agent must be capable of comprehending the reaction to the recipient’s action and be able to understand the series of consequences immediately following from the action performed. Or else, the agent would be unaware of the significance of the action he has done, in which case it is the same as saying he does not have the capacity to be aware of the action.

Thereby, the concept of a moral act must of necessity at least imply there have to be a conscious agent and a recipient whose awareness may or may not be present.

I need to clarify this last sentence, since I see two ways of interpreting what constitutes as a moral act.

First case is that of a simple moral act, and the second being a complex or a mutual moral act.

The first case is simply that when an action is done, but as raised above, that action only involving an agent who is aware (conscious) and a recipient who may not. this as you can see works only one way, as e have seen in the case of the interaction between “I” and a “rock” where I may have a conception, thus feeling, of what may be a fair treatment for the rock, and when I violated my standard I call it an immoral action. However, the rock does not feel a thing or become aware of the action being done to it. Here, what matters is solely my own sentimental value I have for the rock, and that is weighed into a moral measurement.

On the second case, however, is of a complex one, or a mutually conceived moral act. It is on this second morality that we should put more focus on, since we usually mean by morality this type of morality. Therefore, in this essay, I say simply that “an action is moral” or “a moral action is that…” to refer to the second type of the morality from now on.

A moral action between sensible agents, that is, any action involved two or more sensible agents, must be mutually conceivable and agreed upon that an action was indeed morally right. Because of this nature, one cannot simply rely on his own sense of morality, e.g., his standard of what is moral as done when interacting with another Inanimate Object, but rather, he must establish a mutual ground of standard that is agreeable to either party. Thus, this requires not only a recipient who is capable of feeling and being aware of an action being acted upon, but also an agent has to be able to comprehend the situation and the consequences of his action at least for the few responses away into the future.

The condition is that 1) the agent must be aware of the implication of the action he is about to be do, 2) the recipient must be able to feel the action inflicted upon him, and 3) the agent must be able to study or at least observe the reaction of the recipient to the action acted upon him. Further, 4) the agent must be able to feel as well as understand what sort of effect his action has produced to the recipient of that action. So in order to have a concept of what action constitutes as moral, the agent must be capable of feeling, being aware, and of looking at the situation impartial to himself – otherwise he would not be able to achieve the understanding of what effect his action has produced to the recipient.

Therefore, the conception of a moral action rests mostly on the agent. Though the intentions for performing an action may either justify an immoral action or make what may usually be conceived as an immoral act into a moral one, this faculty is normally restricted to adult human beings that we need not discuss about the intentions for the present purpose of our discussion.

As was said, the agent must possess these capabilities if an action to be judged objectively whether it is moral or immoral.

And for the agent to be able to know any of those that are mentioned, both parties must be responsive to the extent that it is apparent for both parties that the recipient is being inflicted on pain. Therefore, an action and the corresponding reaction must be a series of mutually communicative responses that flag each party that one of them is suffering due to the action performed by the other.

This whole series of process is manifest in a being that is empathetic or is able to be emphatic.

IV: Empathy as a Higher Understanding Tool for Morality

By a higher understanding of morality, I mean that possessing a capability to be emphatic broadens the scope of perspectives not limited to my own, but it extends to that of others. And I hope we can agree that empathy is absent either in Inanimate Objects or in Animate Creatures, but only be seen in some Animals and Human Beings. Here, I say Human Beings instead of Babies, because babies are what potentially become human beings, and what is potentially capable of becoming is actually capable of becoming. Thus, although babies do not possess empathy for others, they are by their own nature considered that they do potentially. In this respect, any animals are the same. Some animals may not have developed empathy yet, but it is by nature capable of possessing one if nothing impedes or prevents from it to possess it.

In this respect, I consider babies as the human beings or potential and inevitable human beings that are entitled to the sort of moral consideration we have for those who do actually possess empathy.

Therefore, for an action to be moral or immoral, the agent must have a capacity to be emphatic, for empathy gives moral consideration.

Humans, as well as Animals who possess empathy, have a natural inclination to be emphatic towards each other, and that inclination is stronger, that is, the empathy is felt stronger when it is directed towards their own kind. This has been shown by the argument for self-preservation.

As has been said in the last chapter of the argument, in order to create, or generate, empathy to the agent, an each party must be mutually communicative in their responses.

It is therefore easier and natural to generate empathy between the agents within the same species/groups, but it becomes harder to convey that same amount of empathy from someone in one kind of species to another in a different kind of species, and this is due to the notion of self-preservation, as well as the inclination to feel empathy towards the species of his own kind more naturally than to feel empathy towards the one of another kind of species, as protecting another species over my own may imply the preservation of that species and not our own, which is in a direct contradiction with the principle we each living creature stands for.

V: The Formula for Possessing Empathy

As has been seen, in order for there to be a concept of morality or in order for an action to be regarded as moral or the otherwise, the agents must be capable of feeling to assume there is the conception of a moral action, and they must be also intelligible enough to apply that conception of a moral action, that is, an action that is morally good or encouraged.

To summarize,

Feeling + Application = Empathy

By possessing the feeling, it has a potential possessing of empathy, thus any beings that have feelings who have inflicted pain upon others may be rightfully accused of lacking moral aspect of his being. For such a being, it is only recommended as well as encouraged to develop his moral being so that it can achieve a state of possessing empathy.

By possessing feeling and understanding the application of morals, that is, being able to observe the consequences and feel what sort of effect his action has produced to another being, one has empathy actually.

For such a being, any action that is not corresponsive to the implication of possessing of empathy is deemed to be considered as a moral wrongdoing, and the violation of empathy is immoral, for it is the mutual understanding of empathy that determines how much moral consideration the recipient deserves, and the weight of empathy varies depending on which group category you are in and if the action involves within one group or among two or more groups.

Thus, we are not only right, but morally responsible, and thus morally encouraged, to treat human babies a little more valuably than an animal that at the time of comparison have almost the same capability as that of the babies.